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Abstract
Many web services like eBay, Tripadvisor, Epinions, etc, provide his-
torical product ratings so that users can evaluate the quality of products.
Product ratings are important since they affect how well a product will
be adopted by the market. The challenge is that we only have ”partial
information” on these ratings: Each user provides ratings to only a ”small
subset of products”. Under this partial information setting, we explore a
number of fundamental questions: What is the ”minimum number of rat-
ings” a product needs so one can make a reliable evaluation of its quality?
How users’ misbehavior (such as cheating) in product rating may affect
the evaluation result? To answer these questions, we present a formal
mathematical model of product evaluation based on partial information.
We derive theoretical bounds on the minimum number of ratings needed
to produce a reliable indicator of a product’s quality. We also extend our
model to accommodate users’ misbehavior in product rating. We carry
out experiments using both synthetic and real-world data (from TripAd-
visor, Amazon and eBay) to validate our model, and also show that using
the ”majority rating rule” to aggregate product ratings, it produces more
reliable and robust product evaluation results than the ”average rating
rule”.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, it is common in many web services that users can contribute their
opinions in the form of ratings or reviews. For example, we see ratings or re-
views in content sharing sites (i.e., Flickr, YouTube, etc), online recommenda-
tion systems (i.e., Amazon, MovieLens, etc), product review sites (i.e., Epinions,
TripAdvisor, etc), and online e-commerce systems (i.e., eBay, etc), etc. With
these ratings and product reviews, one can perform information search or make
purchase decisions by taking advantage of the opinions of other users (aka ”wis-
dom of the crowd”). Web-based online rating systems can be briefly described
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as follows: There are a number of items (either products or services), each user
provides ratings or reviews to a subset of items, and ratings of an item will be
available to the public.
Based on how these ratings are being used, online rating systems can be
classified into two categories. The first category interprets ratings as public
assessment on products[13, 20], where the main interest is in assisting users to
evaluate products’ quality. For example, in eBay, ratings are used to reflect the
quality a product or the reputation of a seller. Other examples of this type of web
services include Tripadvisor, Epinions, Wikipedia, etc. For these web services,
users want to know whether the quality of a product is as good as its declared
historical ratings, or whether the reputation of a seller is fully reflected by its
historical ratings. The second category interprets ratings as users’ preference
information and they are used in users’ preference modeling. This is the view
adopted by researchers in online recommendation systems[2, 18], i.e., in Amazon
and MovieLens, users’ ratings are used to infer users’ preferences[7, 17, 18] as
to make personalized recommendations.
In this paper, we focus on the first category of online rating systems, in
which ratings are interpreted as product quality assessment. Although there
are wide deployment of product ratings in web services, people only have par-
tial information on these ratings: each user only expresses ratings to a small
subset of products. Hence, it is important to understand the ”accuracy” and
”effectiveness” of online rating systems. Little attention has been paid to this
fundamental question. The goal of this paper is to fill this void. We first pro-
vide a mathematical model for a general online rating system, then we explore
a number of fundamental questions, i.e., (a) What is the minimum number of
ratings a product needs so as to have a reliable reflection on its quality? (b) How
users’ misbehavior may affect the the accuracy? To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper that provides a formal mathematical model and analysis
on such problem. Our contributions are:
• We propose a mathematical model to specify the rating behavior of users
to a set of products. Our model is general enough to represent both
honest and misbehaving users in product rating. We analyze the model
and derive the minimum number of ratings we need to produce a reliable
reflection on a product’s quality. We also derive the minimum fraction of
misbehaving users such that they can manipulate an online rating system
(please refer to Section 2 and 3).
• We propose an inference algorithm to infer parameters of our model from
partial information, say available products’ ratings (please refer to Section
4).
• We show that the majority rule is more robust and insensitive to users’
misbehavior as compared with the average scoring rule (please refer to
Section 3 and Section 5).
• We perform experiments using both synthetic data and real-world data
(data set from TripAdvisor, Amazon and eBay) to validate our framework
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and to examine various factors that may affect product quality evaluation.
We find a number of interesting observations, i.e., the system can resist
a small fraction of misbehaving users. For TtripAdvisor, Amazon, and
Ebay, we also show why the majority rule is more robust and reliable than
the average scoring rule in evaluating products’ quality. (please refer to
Section 5 and Section 6).
This is the outline of the paper. In §2, we present the mathematical model
of product rating systems. In §3, we show the analysis and derive theoretical
results for two rating aggregation rules under normal or misbehaving setting. In
§4, we present an inference algorithm to infer the parameters of our model. In
§5, we present our experimental results using synthetic data. In §6, we present
our experimental results using real-world data. Related work is given in §7 and
§8 concludes.
2 Mathematical Model
Let there be a finite set of N products denoted by P1, . . . , PN . We haveM users
denote by U1, . . . , UM . Each user only expresses ratings to a subset of products
on an m-level cardinal metric where ratings are drawn from {1, . . . ,m}, i.e.,
a 3-level cardinal metric could be: {1 = ”poor”, 2 = ”good”, 3 = ”excellent”}.
Ratings from users are independent. Product Pi is rated by ni ≤ M users.
Let ri = {ri,1, . . . , ri,M} denote a set of M ratings of product Pi, where ri,j ∈
{1, . . . ,m} if user Uj rates product Pi, otherwise ri,j=0. Higher rating implies
higher quality. We treat the available ratings as partial information because
some ri,k = 0. To make a purchase decision, a user evaluates the quality of
products relying on historical product ratings. The objective of this work is to
answer how various factors can influence the evaluation accuracy.
Let A denote a rating aggregation rule which is used to summarize all ratings
of a product. Two commonly used rating aggregating rules are the majority rule
and the average scoring rule.
•Majority rule. It evaluates the quality of a product via the majority ratings.
Let ℓi∈{1, . . . ,m} represents the label which reflects the true quality of product
Pi under this policy. Let ℓ̂i denote the evaluated label of product Pi produced
by applying the majority rule. The label ℓ̂i can be computed as follows. Let
ni,k be the number of ratings of Pi that is of level k, where k∈{1, ...,m}. Then
ℓ̂i = argmaxk{ni,k}. There are a number of interesting questions to explore,
i.e., How many ratings, or ni, do we need so as to have a strong guarantee in
revealing the true label, or Pr
[
ℓ̂i=ℓi
]
with high probability?
• Average scoring rule. It evaluates the quality of a product via averaging
all ratings of that product. Let γi ∈ [1,m] denote the true quality of Pi under
this policy. Let r̂i=
∑
j ri,j/ni denote the evaluated label of Pi using the average
scoring rule. Again, there are number of interesting questions to explore, i.e.,
how many ratings, or ni do we need, such that r̂i accurately reflects γi?
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Remark: There should be no confusion between ℓi and γi. They show two
different ways in evaluating the quality of products either by the ratings of
the majority population, or by averaging the ratings on the whole population
respectively.
Because each user may rate a product differently. To describe a user’s rating
behavior, let us first present the probabilistic model in product rating.
2.1 Model for rating behavior
When rating a product, a user needs to evaluate its quality. We consider two
most important factors that may affect the evaluation: (a) intrinsic quality of
products, and (b) preference of users on a product. The rating behavior of
different users can be modeled by a random variable in which one can vary its
mean or variance to reflect the above factors. Specifically, a higher mean implies
that the product has a higher intrinsic quality, while a smaller variance implies
that a user prefers a particular branding.
To illustrate, consider the user Uj who rates product Pi, and the rating is
ri,j . The rating ri,j is a random variable, and its probability mass function
(pmf) is:
Pr[ri,j = k] = ρk, k = 1, . . . ,m, (1)
where ρk ≥ 0 and
∑m
k=1 ρk=1. One can set the mean or variance by varying the
probability mass distribution {ρ1, . . . , ρm} to reflect different intrinsic quality
or users preference on product Pi. To model the collective rating behavior of
the whole user population over product Pi, let
S =
{
(θ1, . . . , θm)|
∑m
i=1
θi = 1, θi ≥ 0, ∀i
}
denote the space over all the possible probability distributions of a rating. We
assume that there is an underlying distribution, say D(Pi), over the space S,
that defines the collective rating behavior of the whole user population over
product Pi. In this study, D(Pi) is a Dirichlet distribution Dirichlet(αi) with
density function:
p(θ1, . . . , θm) =
Γ(
∑m
k=1 αi,k)∏m
k=1 Γ(αi,k)
m∏
k=1
θ
αi,k−1
k . (2)
where αi=(αi,1, . . . , αi,m),
∑m
k=1 αi,k=1 and αi,k > 0, ∀k.
Remark: The choice of Dirichlet distribution is validated in [3].
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we analyze two most representative rating aggregation rules:
majority rule and average scoring rule, that are widely used in online rating
systems. The central question we seek to answer is how many ratings of a given
product we need so that the aggregate rating is statistically accurate to reflect
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the ground truth of that product’s quality? Furthermore, we also analyze the
impact of misbehavior in product rating, e.g., when users intentionally rate a
product beyond its ground truth level. In this section, we assume that the
model parameters αi, ∀i, are given. In Section 4, we will show how to infer
these parameters from historical ratings.
3.1 Majority rule
Majority rule is suggested as a good rule to aggregate ratings[1]. This rule
helps a user to understand how receptive the majority of the masses are toward
a given product. Note that we only have partial information, and this makes
it challenging to extract the true label of products. There are a number of
interesting questions to explore, i.e., how many ratings do we need so that
we can extract the true label with high probability? What is the effect of
misbehavior in ratings? Let us begin our exploration by a simple case, say all
users rate products honestly.
Analysis for Honest Rating: In this case, we assume that with a large enough
number of ratings, one can successfully extract the true label of products. Recall
that ℓ̂i is the label of product Pi produced by using the majority rule on its
ratings, and ℓi is the true label of product Pi. Intuitively, the true label of
product Pi occurs when ℓi= limni→∞ ℓ̂i. Recall that Pi has ni ratings and its
rating set is ri, where missing ratings are denoted by zeros. For convenience,
here we use r+i = {r+i,1, . . . , r+i,ni} to denote a set of all positive (or observed)
ratings of ri. Let us state the probability mass function (pmf) of r
+
i,j , j =
1, . . . , ni in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The pmf of the rating r+i,j is:
Pr
[
r+i,j = k
]
= αi,k, for k = 1, . . . ,m,
where i=1, . . . , N and j=1, . . . , ni.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Lemma 1 states that the probability of product Pi receiving a rating k is
αi,k. It follows that ℓi=limni→∞ ℓ̂i=argmaxk{αi,k}. Let α˜i denote the second
largest value among αi,1, . . . , αi,m. Now we state the main theorem for the
honest rating case.
Theorem 1 (Honest Rating Case) Suppose all users rate honestly, and prod-
uct Pi has at least
ni ≥ n′i =
12αi,ℓi
(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
ln
m
δ
(3)
ratings, then one can claim with high probability that the true label of product
Pi is ℓ̂i. Mathematically, we have: Pr
[
ℓ̂i = ℓi
]
≥ 1− δ.
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Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Table 1 shows some numerical results on the minimum number of ratings we
need when all users rate honestly. It depicts the level of rating metric m, the
model parameter αi, the success probability 1−δ and the lower bound of the
minimum number of ratings denoted by n′i respectively. From the table, we see
that if we increase the success probability (1−δ), we also need to increase n′i.
m αi = (αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4, αi,5) 1− δ n
′
i
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.7 67
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 77
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.9 93
Table 1: Honest rating: minimum number of ratings.
Remark: Theorem 1 gives an lower bound on the minimum number of ratings
ni. One may ask whether this bound is sufficiently tight. The following theorem
answers this question.
Theorem 2 (Tightness) Suppose all users rate honestly and α˜i ≥ 100101αi,ℓi .
Then there exist a positive constant η, such that for any δ ≤ η, if product Pi
has at most
ni = O
(
αi,ℓi
(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
ln
1
δ
)
ratings, then we will fail to extract the true label with probability at least Ω(δ).
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 2 states the lower bound derived in Theorem 1 is asymp-
totically tight in general.
Analysis of Rating under Misbehavior: Let us now explore the effect
misbehavior in ratings. We consider the following typical cases of misbehavior:
• Random misbehavior. A random misbehavior implies that a user as-
signs a random rating to a product. This is one typical misbehavior,
because sometimes a user may not want to spend time to evaluate the
quality of a product so that user just generates random rating.
• Biased misbehavior: A biased misbehavior implies that a user is biased
toward one particular rating, i.e., a user may be hired by a company to
assign the lowest rating to a competitor’s product, or assign the high-
est rating to his employer’s product. This type of misbehavior has been
observed in many web services, i.e., reported in TripAdvisor[1].
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In the remaining of this sub-section, we model the ratings of misbehaving
users as noise. We specify the collective rating behavior of honest users to
product Pi using our model with parameter αi. Again, ℓi=argmax{αi,k} is the
true label of product Pi and α˜i is the second largest value among αi,1, . . . , αi,m.
The following theorem states the effect of random misbehavior.
Theorem 3 (Resist Random Misbehavior) Let fi < 1 denote the fraction
of random misbehaving users who rate product Pi. If product Pi has
ni ≥ n′i =
12(fi/m+ (1− fi)αi,ℓi)
(1 − fi)2(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
ln
m
δ
ratings, then one can claim with high probability that the true label of product
Pi is ℓ̂i. Mathematically, we have: Pr
[
ℓ̂i = ℓi
]
≥ 1− δ.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 3 states that if the fraction of random misbehavior is less
than 1, then one can always extract the true label of a product with a large
enough number of ratings.
Table 2 shows some numerical results of the minimum number of ratings
when some ratings are assigned by random misbehaving users. Table 2 depicts
m, αi, 1−δ, n′i, and the fraction of random misbehaving users fi respectively.
We can see that if we increase fi, we also need to increase the minimum number
of ratings.
m αi = (αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4, αi,5) 1− δ fi n
′
i
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 0 77
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 0.1 88
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 0.2 102
Table 2: Random misbehavior: minimum number of ratings.
We now consider the effect of biased misbehavior. Let ℓ′i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denote
the rating that biased misbehaving users bias toward. The goal of the biased
users is to make the extracted label of a product to be the label that they bias
toward. Then, how many biased users is needed such that they will achieve
thier goal with high probability? The following theorem answers this question.
Theorem 4 (Biased Misbehaving Users Win) Let f ′i denote the fraction
of biased misbehaving users who rate product Pi. If the fraction of biased
misbehaving users is no less than f ′i > (αi,ℓi−αi,ℓ′i)/(1+αi,ℓi−αi,ℓ′i), then with
at least
ni ≥

12
(
f ′i + (1 − f ′i)αi,ℓ′i
)(
f ′i + (1− f ′i)(αi,ℓ′i − αi,ℓi)
)2 ln mδ , ℓ′i 6= ℓi
12 (f ′i + (1− f ′i)αi,ℓi)
(f ′i + (1 − f ′i)(αi,ℓi − α˜i))2
ln
m
δ
, ℓ′i = ℓi
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ratings, one can claim with high probability that the biased misbehaving users
win. Mathematically, we have: Pr
[
ℓ̂i = ℓ
′
i
]
≥ 1− δ.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: Theorem 4 states two conditions for biased misbehaving users to win:
a large enough fraction of biased misbehaving users and a large enough number
of such ratings.
Table 3 shows some numerical results of the minimum fraction of biased
misbehaving users so that they can distort the evaluation process. Table 3
depicts m, αi, n
′
i, and the label that the biased misbehaving users bias toward
ℓ′i respectively. From Table 3 we could see that if biased misbehaving users
biased toward 5 (or 1), and to ensure they can distort, the minimum fraction of
biased misbehaving users we need is 0.407 (or 0.375).
m αi = (αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4, αi,5) ℓ
′
i f
′
i
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 5 0.407
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 1 0.375
Table 3: Biased misbehavior: minimum fraction of misbehaving users to distort
the evaluation.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the misbehaving users bias against the ground
truth label, or ℓ′i 6= ℓi. If the fraction of biased misbehaving users who rate
product Pi is at least f
′
i > (αi,ℓi −αi,ℓ′i)/(1+αi,ℓi −αi,ℓ′i), then it is impossible
to extract the true label with high probability no matter how many ratings we
have.
The following theorem states that when the fraction of biased misbehaving
users is small, we can resist this type of anomaly.
Theorem 5 (Resist Biased Misbehavior) Suppose that the biased misbe-
having users bias against the ground truth label, say ℓ′i 6= ℓi. If the fraction of
biased misbehaving users who rate product Pi is at most f
′
i < (αi,ℓi−αi,ℓ′i)/(1+
αi,ℓi − αi,ℓ′i), then with at least
ni ≥ n′i =
12(1− f ′i)αi,ℓi ln mδ(
(1−f ′i)αi,ℓi−max
{
f ′i+(1−f ′i)αi,ℓ′i , (1−f ′i)α˜i
})2
ratings, then one can claim with high probability that the true label of product
Pi is ℓ̂i. Mathematically, we have: Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi
]
≥ 1− δ.
Proof: The derivation is similar to Theorem 4.
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Table 4 shows some numerical examples of the minimum number of ratings
we need to resist biased misbehavior, when the fraction of biased misbehaving
users is small. From Table 4, we could see that when we increase the fraction
of biased misbehaving users, we also need to increase the minimum number of
ratings.
m αi = (αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4, αi,5) 1− δ ℓ
′
i f
′
i n
′
i
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 5 0 77
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 5 0.1 93
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 5 0.2 182
Table 4: Biased misbehavior: minimum number of ratings to resist biased mis-
behavior.
3.2 Average scoring rule
Average scoring rule evaluates the quality of a product by taking average on all
ratings of that product. There are number of interesting question to explore,
i.e., how many ratings do we need so that we can produce an average rating that
reflects the quality of a product accurately? What is the effect of misbehavior
in ratings? Let us explore these questions here.
Analysis for Honest Rating: We assume that for the honest rating case,
with a large enough number of ratings, we can produce an average rating that
reflects the quality of a product accurately. Recall that the average rating of
product Pi is r̂i =
∑
j ri,j/ni =
∑
j r
+
i,j/ni, and γi is the ground truth value
that reflects the true quality of product Pi. Intuitively, γi can be computed
by γi = limni→∞ r̂i. From Lemma 1, we have that Pr[r
+
i,j = k] = αi,k, where
k=1, . . . ,m and j=1, . . . , ni. Thus, we have γi=
∑
k kαi,k. Let us first explore
the case that all users rate honestly. We present the main theorem for the honest
rating case as follows.
Theorem 6 (Honest Rating Case) Suppose all users rate honestly. If prod-
uct Pi has at least
ni ≥ n′i =
3
ǫ2
ln
2m
δ
(4)
ratings, then
|r̂i − γi| ≤ ǫ√mγi +mǫ2
holds with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: The physical meaning of Theorem 6 is that with a large enough num-
ber of ratings, we can produce an accurate estimation of γi with an arbitrarily
small error .
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Table 5 shows some numerical results on the minimum number of ratings
we need to produce an accurate estimation of γi when all users rate honestly.
Table 5 depicts m, αi, 1− δ, n′i and the absolute error bound between average
rating and its ground truth value, or Er=ǫ
√
mγi +mǫ
2 respectively. We could
see that increasing the minimum number of ratings will decrease the error. It
is also interesting to observe that using the average score rule, we need at least
221 ratings, while one only needs 77 ratings using the majority rule (please refer
to Table 1).
m αi = (αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4, αi,5) 1− δ Er n
′
i
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 1 221
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 0.75 366
5 ( 4
35
, 25
35
, 3
35
, 2
35
, 1
35
) 0.8 0.5 716
Table 5: Honest rating: minimum number of ratings (average scoring rule).
Analysis of Rating under Misbehavior: We consider random misbehavior
and biased misbehavior specified in last sub-section. We treat the ratings of
misbehaving users as noise. The collective rating behavior of the honest users
to product Pi is specified by our model with parameter αi and γi=
∑
k kαi,k is
the ground truth value of average rating of product Pi. The following theorems
state the effect of random misbehavior and biased misbehavior respectively.
Theorem 7 (Random Misbehavior) Let fi denote the fraction of random
misbehaving users who rate product Pi. If product Pi has ni ≥ 3 ln(2m/δ)/ǫ2
ratings, then
|m/2−γi|fi−ǫ
√
m(γi+mfi/2− γifi)−mǫ2≤|r̂i−γi|
≤ ǫ
√
m (γi+mfi/2− γifi) +mǫ2 + |m/2−γi| fi
holds with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Theorem 8 (Biased Misbehavior) Let ℓ′i denote the rating that the biased
misbehaving users bias toward. Let f ′i denote the fraction of biased misbehaving
users who rate product Pi. If product Pi has ni ≥ 3 ln(2m/δ)/ǫ2 ratings, then
|ℓ′i−γi| f ′i−ǫ
√
m (γi+f ′iℓ
′
i−γif ′i)−mǫ2 ≤ |r̂i − γi|
≤ ǫ
√
m (γi + f ′iℓ
′
i − γif ′i) +mǫ2 + |ℓ′i − γi| f ′i
holds with probability at least 1− δ.
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Proof: Please refer to the appendix for derivation.
Remark: The physical meaning of Theorem 7 and 8 is that average scoring rule
is sensitive to random and biased misbehavior. If the fraction of misbehaving
users is small, then we can still reflect the true quality of products with a high
probability, otherwise it is impossible to accurately reveal the ground truth.
4 Inferring Model Parameters
In last section, we presented the formal analysis of our model with the assump-
tion that the model’s parameters αi, ∀i are known. In this section, we show
how to obtain these parameters’ values by presenting a maximum likelihood in-
ference algorithm to infer these parameters αi, ∀i from partial information, or
historical ratings. With this inference algorithm, we can apply our framework
to analyze and improve the applications of online rating systems in web services,
i.e., eBay, TripAdvisor, etc.
Recall that r+i = {r+i,1, . . . , r+i,ni} represents a set of all observed ratings of
product Pi. We seek to infer αi from r
+
i . From Lemma 1, we could write down
the probability mass function (pmf) of r+i,j as follows: Pr[r
+
i,j =k]=αi,k, where
j=1, . . . , ni and k=1, . . . ,m. Let ni,k denote the number of ratings of product
Pi that equal to k. Then the likelihood of the parameter αi given a set of
observed ratings r+i can be expressed as:
L(αi) = p(r+i |αi) =
∏ni
j=1
p(r+i,j |αi) =
∏m
k=1
(αi,k)
ni,k .
The remaining issue is to derive the maximum likelihood estimation of the
parameter αi, which is denoted by α̂i, via maximizing L(αi). This is equivalent
to maximize the log likelihood function:
L(αi) = logL(αi) =
∑m
k=1
ni,k logαi,k
=
∑m−1
k=1
ni,k logαi,k + ni,m log(1−
∑m−1
k=1
αi,k).
By maximizing L(αi), we obtain the maximum likelihood estimation of αi as
follows:
α̂i,k =
ni,k
ni
, for k = 1, . . . ,m .
The inference algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Remark: The running time of this algorithm is Θ(
∑N
i=1 |r+i |), or the running
time is linear with respect to the number of ratings.
5 Experiments on Synthetic Data
Let us first use synthetic data to examine various factors that influence the
accuracy of product quality evaluation. This will help us gain some insights on
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Algorithm 1 Inference algorithm for model parameters
Input: A set of ratings of product Pi: r
+
i = {r+i,1, . . . , r+i,ni}
Output: α̂i
1: ni,k = |{r+i,j |r+i,j ∈ r+i , r+i,j = k}|, k = 1, . . . ,m
2: for k = 1 to m do
3: α̂i,k = ni,k/ni
4: end for
improving applications of online rating systems. We consider an online rating
system with a 5-level cardinal rating metric, say m=5. We start our evaluation
from the context where the majority rule is used to aggregate ratings. Then we
discuss the context corresponding to the average scoring rule.
5.1 Majority rule
We start with the case that all users are honest, then explore when some users
misbehave in their ratings.
Experiment 1: Effect of Model Parameter αi and Success Probabil-
ity. In this experiment, we study the honest ratings case where all users rate
honestly. To examine the effect of model parameters, we synthesize the rat-
ings of two products, say Pi and Pj , using our model with parameter αi =
( 435 ,
5
7 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ,
1
35 ) and αj = (
6
35 ,
4
7 ,
4
35 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ) respectively. Let n
′ denote the
minimum number of ratings we need to extract the true label of a product with
success probability of at least 1− δ. To examine the effect of the success prob-
ability, we vary 1 − δ from 0.7 to 0.9. The numerical results of n′ are shown
in Fig. 1, where the horizontal axis represents the success probability, or 1−δ,
and the vertical axis shows the corresponding minimum number of ratings, or
n′. From Fig. 1 we have the following observations. First, when we increase
the success probability, or 1− δ, the minimum number of ratings increased. In
other words, to improve the success probability, we need a larger the number of
ratings. Note that the minimum number of ratings increases only with a small
rate. To extract the true label with the same probability, we need far more
ratings for product Pj (with a higher variance in rating scores than Pi) than Pi.
Lessons learned: Increasing the success probability increases the minimum
number of ratings. The variance on rating scores of a product has a significant
impact on the minimum number of ratings. So it is interesting to explore further,
i.e., are these results sensitive to misbehavior? Let us continue to explore.
Experiment 2: Effect of Random Misbehavior. We extend the online
rating system specified in Exp. 1 to a system where the user population con-
sists of honest users and random misbehaving users. We synthesize the rat-
ings of product Pi from the honest users using our model with parameter
αi = (
4
35 ,
5
7 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ,
1
35 ). Here n
′ represents the same measure as specified in
Exp. 1. To examine the effect of random misbehavior, we vary the fraction of
random misbehaving users from 0 to 0.8. The numerical results of n′ are shown
in Fig. 2 in which three curves correspond to success probability of at least 0.7,
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Figure 2: Impact of randommisbehav-
ior.
0.8, 0.9 respectively. We can observe that when the fraction of misbehavior is
less than 0.6, increasing the fraction of random misbehaving users only increases
the minimum number of ratings slightly. When the fraction of misbehavior is
larger than 0.6, a small increase in the fraction of random misbehavior can
increase the minimum number of ratings remarkably.
Lessons learned: When random misbehaving users exist, one can still extract
the true label of a product with a price of increasing the minimum number of
ratings. A small fraction of random misbehavior only increases the minimum
number of ratings slightly. This shows the robustness of majority rule. But
when this fraction is increased beyond a certain threshold, we need a lot more
ratings to compensate. Next, we explore the impact of biased misbehavior in
users’ ratings.
Experiment 3: Effect of Biased Misbehavior. We extend the online rating
system specified in Exp. 1 to the system where the user population consists of
honest users and biased misbehaving users who bias toward one specific rat-
ing. We synthesize the ratings of product Pi from the honest users using our
model with parameter αi = (
4
35 ,
5
7 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ,
1
35 ). The biased misbehaving users
bias toward rating 5. From Theorem 4 and 5, one can still extract the true
label with a high probability if the fraction of biased misbehaving users is less
than 0.407. But if that fraction is larger than 0.407, then it is impossible to
extract the true label with high probability. We vary the fraction of biased mis-
behaving users from 0 to 0.3. Here n′ represents the same measure as specified
in Exp. 1. The numerical results of n′ are shown in Fig. 3. To compare the
impact of random misbehavior and biased misbehavior, we draw another curve
corresponding to random misbehavior in Fig. 3 also. From Fig. 3 we have the
following observations. When the fraction of biased misbehaving users is small,
say less than 0.1, increasing the fraction of biased misbehaving users only in-
creases the minimum number of ratings slightly. When that fraction is larger
than 0.1, a small increase in the fraction of biased misbehaving users can re-
markably increase the minimum number of ratings needed. The majority rule
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is more robust against random misbehavior compared to biased misbehavior,
since the curve corresponding to random misbehavior is quite flat.
Lessons learned: Majority rule is robust and can resist a small fraction, say
less than 0.1, of biased misbehaving users. Also, the majority rule is robust
against random misbehavior. The biased misbehavior is more disruptive than
the random misbehavior in distorting the evaluation process.
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Figure 3: Impact of biased misbehav-
ior.
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9600
700
800
900
1000
1 − δ
n
’
 
 
αj = (6/35, 4/7, 4/35, 3/35, 2/35)
αi = (4/35, 5/7, 3/35, 2/35, 1/25)
E
r
 = 0.5
Average score rule
Figure 4: Impact of model parameter
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5.2 Average scoring rule
We start our study with a simple case, say all users rate honestly.
Experiment 4: Effect of Model Parameters αi and Success Probabil-
ity. We study the case where all users rate honestly. To examine the effect of
model parameters, we synthesize the ratings of two products, say Pi and Pj , us-
ing our model with parameter αi=(
4
35 ,
5
7 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ,
1
35 ) and αj=(
6
35 ,
4
7 ,
4
35 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 )
respectively. Let Er denote the absolute error bound between the average rating
and its ground truth value. We set Er=0.5. Let n
′ denote the minimum num-
ber of ratings a product needs so as to guarantee that the absolute error is less
or equal to Er with probability of at least 1−δ. We vary the success probability
1 − δ from 0.7 to 0.9. The numerical results of n′ are shown in Fig. 4, where
the horizontal axis represents the success probability, or 1−δ, and the vertical
axis shows the corresponding minimum number of ratings, or n′. We have the
following observations. The minimum number of ratings is insensitive to the
given parameters αi and αj , since these two curves in Fig. 4 similar. When
we increase the success probability, we increase the minimum number of ratings
slightly.
Now we compare the performance of the two score aggregation rules we
study. We compare the minimum number of ratings for the majority rule and
the average scoring rule and the results are shown in Table 6. One can see that
to achieve the same level of confidence, we need a lot more ratings for average
scoring rule.
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1− δ 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
n′ (majority) 67 70 77 83 93
n′ (average score) 642 675 716 769 843
Table 6: Comparison of minimum number of ratings for majority rule and
average scoring rule.
Random misbehavior
fraction of bad users 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
n′ (majority) 89 94 102 112 122
n′ (average score) 842 882 947 1018 1099
Biased misbehavior
fraction of bad users 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
n′ (majority) 93 125 181 296 259
n′ (average score) 1107 1452 2027 3110 5600
Table 7: Impact of misbehavior on two rating aggregation rules
Lessons learned: To obtain a reliable evaluation of product quality using the
average scoring rule, we need remarkably more ratings than using the majority
rule. The minimum number of ratings is insensitive to model parameters or
success probability. This implies that the majority rule requires less ratings to
guarantee the same level of confidence, so it is the preferred rating aggregation
rule.
Effect of Misbehavior. To examine the effect of misbehavior, we extend the
online rating system as specified in Exp. 4: one consists of honest users and ran-
dom misbehaving users, and the other one consists of honest users and biased
misbehaving users. We synthesize the ratings of product Pi from the honest
users using our model with parameter αi=(
4
35 ,
5
7 ,
3
35 ,
2
35 ,
1
35 ). The biased mis-
behaving users bias toward rating 5. For both extensions, we vary the fraction
of misbehaving users from 0.1 to 0.3. Here n′ and Er (set to 0.5) represents the
same measure as specified in Exp. 4. The numerical results of n′ are shown in
Table 7. To compare the robustness of the majority rule and the average scor-
ing rule, we show the numerical results of n′ corresponding to the majority rule
in the same table. From Table 7, we could see that the majority rule is more
robust against misbehavior (either random misbehavior or biased misbehavior),
since to resist the same fraction of misbehaving users, the average scoring rule
requires a lot more ratings.
6 Experiments on real data
In this section, we show the experimental results on three large datasets which
we obtain via web crawling: hotel ratings from TripAdvisor, product ratings
from Amazon, and seller ratings from Ebay. We first validate our model with
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these three datasets, and then explore a number of important questions, i.e.,
what’s the minimum number of ratings a hotel/product/seller needs to receive
so that one can evaluate its quality accurately?
6.1 Datasets
TripAdvisor. It is one of the most popular travel websites which assists cus-
tomers in booking hotels, restaurants, etc, and post travel-related opinions in
the form of ratings (or reviews) to hotels, restaurants, etc. We crawled the his-
torical ratings of 11,540 hotels. Table 8 shows the overall statistics of the data
set.
Amazon. Amazon is one of the most popular recommendation systems that
assists customers in product adoption, and one can post opinions on products
in the form of ratings (or reviews). We crawled the historical ratings of 32,888
products. Table 8 shows the overall statistics of the data set.
Ebay. Ebay is an E-commerce system that assists customers in online product
purchasing, and customers can post opinions of sellers in the form of ratings (or
reviews) to reflect the reputation of a seller. We crawled the historical ratings
of 4,586 sellers. Table 8 shows the overall statistics of the data set.
TripAdvisor Amazon Ebay
Number of items 11,540 32,888 4,586
Total number of ratings 3,114,876 5,066,070 19,217,083
Maximum / Minimum on 9930/1 24,195/1 117,100/1
number of ratings
Mean / Median on 269.9/179 154/47 4190/1437
number of ratings
Rating metricr: {1, ..., m} 1, . . . , 5 1, . . . , 5 1, . . . , 12
Table 8: Statistics for three rating data sets.
6.2 Model validation
We validate our model by showing that if an item meets the requirement on
minimum number of ratings, then the evaluation of its quality is indeed reliable.
Extract minimum number of ratings. To extract the minimum number of
ratings, we need to first estimate model parameters αi, ∀i. Since the accuracy
depends on the number of ratings, therefore, we select those items with a large
number of ratings, i.e., those with at least 400 ratings. Table 9 shows the number
of items in the dataset satisfy this selection criteria. From Table 9 we could see
that in total we select 2368 + 2396 + 3307=8071 items out. We map the ID of
these 8071 items to 1, ..., 8071 and use P1, . . . , P8071 to denote them. For each
selected item Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 8071}, we applly Algorithm 1 on their rating sets,
so as to obtain an estimation of its model parameter denoted by α̂i. We use
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the inferred parameters α̂i to compute the minimum number of ratings for item
Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 8071}, setting the success probability 1−δ=0.8, and Er = 0.5.
We use n′ to denote the desired minimum number of ratings an item needs.
Model validation algorithm design. The dataset is with time stamps.
Based on this, our validation procedure can be stated as follows. For each
time stamp we first check if the number of ratings of a hotel (up to that time
stamp) meets the requirement on minimum number of ratings. If yes, we then
apply a rating aggregation rule to evaluate its quality (based on the historical
ratings up to that time stamp), and check if the evaluation is reliable. After
we finished the whole process, we compute the faction of evaluations which are
reliable. We outline our model validation algorithm in Algorithm 2. We use the
following notations in the algorithm. For each hotel, we sort its ratings based on
ratings’ times tamps. Let τi= {τi,1, . . . , τi,ni} denote a set of sorted ratings of
hotel Pi, where i=1, . . . , 8071, ni is the number of ratings of Pi, and τi,1 is the
earliest rating. Let Ntest denote the number of time stamps that an item meets
the desired minimum number of ratings, Nreliable denote the number of reliable
evaluations, and the faction of reliable evaluations is denoted by freliable.
TripAdvisor Amazon Ebay
# of selected items 2368 2396 3307
Table 9: Number of selected items.
We apply Algorithm 2 on TripAdvisor, Amazon and Ebay datasets respec-
tively, and we compute the faction of reliable evaluations freliable for each of
them seperately. The results of freliable are shown in Table 10, which depicts
rating aggregation rules, the number of time stamps a hotel meets the require-
ment of minimum number of ratings Ntest, the number of reliable evaluations
Nreliable, and the faction of reliable evaluations freliable. From Table 10, we
have two observations. First, if a product meets the requirement on minimum
number of ratings, then the evaluation of its quality is indeed reliable, because
the value of freliable is around 99%. This shows the correctness of our model
and our mathematical framework. Secondly, it shows the robustness of the
majority rule since we have more time stamps (or ratings) that satisfy the min-
imum requirement. In fact, the majority rule has around three times (836088
/ 296309 ≈ 2.82, TripAdvisor), two times (2246804 / 981886 ≈ 2.29, Amazon),
and 1.28 times (16667935 / 13008919 ≈ 1.28, Ebay) the number of ratings that
can be used for reliable evaluation. We explore why this is the case in the next
subsection.
6.3 Examine minimum number of ratings
We consider the same set of items and we use the same settings specified in
the previous sub-section. Again, n′ denotes the required minimum number of
ratings a product (hotel) needs. The statistics of n′ across items are shown in
Table 11, where f[0,400] denotes the fraction of items with n
′ ∈ [0, 400], and we
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for model validation
Input: τi1 , . . . , τin , α̂i1 , . . . , α̂in , rating aggregation rule A
Output: Ntest, Nreliable, freliable
1: Ntest ← 0, Nreliable ← 0
2: for κ ∈ {i1, . . . , in} do
3: Extract the true quality of Pi, say if A is majority rule, then the true
quality is γi = argmaxk{α̂i1,k}, and if A is average score rule, then the
true quality is γi =
∑
k kα̂i1,k
4: n′ ← minimum number of ratings Pi needs
5: for j = n′ to |τκ| do
6: Ntest ← Ntest + 1
7: if A({τi,1, . . . , τi,j}) reflects the true quality of Pi then
8: Nreliable ← Nreliable + 1
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: freliable = Nreliable/Ntest
use MR and ASR to denote majority rule and average score rule respectively
for brevity. From Table 11, we have the following observations. For the average
scoring rule, nearly all items need more than 800 ratings. In fact 99.45% hotels
(TripAdvisor), 99.08% products (Amazon), and 99.97% sellers (Ebay) need more
than 800 rating. And a large fraction of them need more than 1200 ratings, say
47.55% hotels (TripAdvisor), 61.56% products (Amazon) and 98.34% sellers
(Ebay). But for the majority rule, more than half the hotels only need less than
800 ratings, say 58.79% hotels, 88.22% products, 82.8% sellers need less than
800 ratings. What’s more, a large fraction of them need less than 400 ratings,
i.e., around 39.74% hotels, 80.51% products and 58.06% sellers. In other words,
the minimum number of ratings trend to be of smaller values for the majority
Aggregation Rule Ntest Nreliable freliable
TripAdvisor
Majority rule 836088 835822 99.97%
Average scoring rule 296309 295854 99.85%
Amazon
Majority rule 2246804 2241196 99.75%
Average scoring rule 981886 971987 98.99%
Ebay
Majority rule 16705440 16667935 99.78%
Average scoring rule 13008919 12990199 99.86%
Table 10: Fraction of reliable evaluations when items meet the requirement on
minimum number of ratings.
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rule.
Evaluating rating aggregation rules. We compare robustness of majority
rule and average score rule by examining the distribution of minimum number of
ratings corresponding to them. We use notation Pr[n′≥n] to denote the fraction
of items with minimum number of ratings larger or equal to n. Fig. 5, 6 and 7
show the numerical results of Pr[n′≥n] corresponding to TripAdvisor, Amazon
and Ebay dataset respectively, where the horizontal axis shows the number of
ratings n, and the vertical axis shows the corresponding value of Pr[n′≥n]. From
Fig. 5 we could observe that the distribution curve corresponding to majority
rule lies under the curve corresponding to average score rule. In other words,
majority rule require less ratings than average score rule. This also holds for
Fig. 6 and 7. These results show that majority rule is more robust than average
score rule.
Case studies. We examine the following question: among TripAdivsor, Ama-
zon and Ebay, whose ratings are more reliable ? We answer this question by
comparing the distribution of minimum number of ratings across items for them.
Here we fix the rating aggregation rule to bemajority rule, since it is more robust
than average score rule. Again, we use notation Pr[n′≥n] to denote the fraction
of items with the minimum number of ratings larger or equal to n. The numer-
ical results of Pr[n′ ≥ n] are shown in Fig. 8, where the horizontal axis shows
the number of ratings n, and the vertical axis shows the corresponding value
of Pr[n′ ≥ n]. From Fig. 8 one can observe that, as the web sites varies from
Amazon, Ebay, and TripAdvisor, the corresponding distribution curve move up.
In other words, the minimum number of ratings corresponding to Amazon is
the least and that corresponding to TripAdvisor is the highest. This shows that
Amazon requires less ratings than TripAdvisor and Ebay, and TripAdvisor re-
quires more ratings than Amazon and Ebay. Thus, the ratings on Amazon is
more reliable than TripAdvisor and Ebay.
Here, we study the fraction of items (products, hotels, sellers) which have
sufficient number of ratings. Assume our data sets stated in Table 8 are represen-
tative samples from TripAdvisor, Amazon ane Ebay. Based on this assumption
we explore, the fraction of items which have sufficient number of ratings. We
set the desired minimum number of ratings a product/hotel/seller needs as the
median of the value of minimum number of ratings obtained in the beginning
of this section. Then we test the fraction of products in the data sets stated
in Table 8 satisfy the minimum number of ratings. Let fs denote the fraction
of hotels/products/sellers that satisfy the requirement on minimum number of
ratings. The numerical results fs are shown in Table 12, where Ns denote the
number of hotels/products/sellers that meet the requirement. From Table 12,
we have the following observations: Only 12.8% hotels on TripAdvisor, 21.6%
products on Amazon, 74.1% sellers on Ebay, are with sufficient number of rat-
ings. Ratings on Ebay is more sufficient than TripAdvisor and Amazon.
Lessons learned & tips. Assume we use the majority rule to aggregate rat-
ings, we need at least hundreds of ratings for a hotel (TripAdvisor) / product
(Amazon) / seller (Ebay), so as to produce a reliable evaluation on the qual-
ity of a hotel/product or reputation of a seller. If the number of ratings of a
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f[0,400] f(400,800] f(800,1200] f>1200
TripAdvisor
MR 39.74% 19.05% 7.98% 33.23%
ASR 0% 0.55% 51.9% 47.55%
Amazon
MR 80.51% 7.71% 2.75% 9.02%
ASR 0% 0.92% 37.52% 61.56%
Ebay
MR 58.06% 24.74% 5.59% 11.61%
ASR 0% 0.03% 1.63% 98.34%
Table 11: Statistics of minimum number of ratings across hotels in TripAdvisor.
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hotel/product/seller is lower than 100, then we may be in danger of produce
unreliable evaluations. If we use the average scoring rule to aggregate ratings,
the system needs more ratings (around one thousand of ratings for each ho-
tel/product/seller) than using the majority rule. The majority rule is more
robust and reliable than the average scoring rule. The rating on Amazon is
more reliable than TripAdvisor and Ebay, since to produce a reliable evalua-
tion, Amazon needs less rating than TripAdvisor and Ebay. Ratings on Ebay
are more sufficient than TripAdvisor and Amazon.
6.4 Inferring minimum number of ratings
In real world applications, it may be expensive or sometimes even impossible
to obtain the exact desired minimum number of ratings for a product. Here
we tackle this challenge by designing an efficient algorithm to infer the desired
minimum number of ratings, stated in Algorithm 3. We show the effectiveness
of Algorithm 3 by performing empirical experiments on TripAdvisor, Amazon
and Ebay dataset.
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n′ # of items Ns fs
TripAdvisor 573 11540 1481 12.8%
Amazon 146 32888 7119 21.6%
Ebay 356 4586 3397 74.1%
Table 12: Fraction of hotels satisfy the requirement of minimum number of
ratings.
Inferring minimum number of ratings algorithm design. In real world
web services, ratings are with time stamps. For a given time stamp, we infer the
desired minimum number of ratings for a product based on the historical ratings
(up to the given time stamp) of that product. To infer the desired minimum of
ratings, we first infer the model parameter by applying Algorithm 1 on the the
historical ratings. Then based on the inferred model parameter, we compute
the desired minimum number of ratings. We outline our algorithm for inferring
minimum number of ratings in Algorithm 3, where τi(t)={τi,1, . . . , τi,t} denote
a set of historical ratings (up to time stamp t) of hotel Pi, and τi,1 is the earliest
rating. We use n̂′ to denote the inferred minimum number of ratings.
Empirical evaluations. We illustrate the effectiveness of Algorithm 3 by
showing that if a product meets the inferred minimum number of ratings, then
the evaluations of its quality is indeed reliable. We work on the same dataset
and use the same notations, say with Section 6.2. The datasets are with time
stamps. For each time stamp, we first infer the minimum number of ratings
of that product by performing Algorithm 3 on its historical ratings (up to that
time stamp). And then we check whether the number of ratings is larger than
the inferred minimum number of ratings. If yes, then the number of test time
stamps Ntest will be increased by one, and at the meantime, we further evaluate
the quality of that product based on its ratings up to that time stamp, if the
evaluated quality reflects the true quality (obtained by step 3 of Algorithm 2),
then the number of reliable evaluationsNreliable is increased by one. We consider
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majority rule here. We perform experiments on TripAdvisor, Amazon and Ebay
datasets. The experiment results of Ntest and Nreliable are shown Table 13,
where freliable = Nreliable/Ntest. From Table 13 we could observe that if a
products meets the requirement on the inferred minimum number of ratings,
then the evaluation of its quality is reliable because the value of freliable is
97.27% for TripAdvisor, 98.50% for Amazon, 99.56% for Ebay. This shows the
effectiveness of our algorithm for inferring minimum number of ratings.
Lessons learned. Our algorithm of inferring the minimum number of rat-
ings is effective in producing reliable evaluations of product quality. Our algo-
rithm can be deployed into real world applications of web services.
Algorithm 3 Infer minimum number of ratings
Input: A set of historical ratings τi(t)={τi,1, . . . , τi,t}, rating aggregation rule
A, δ, Er
Output: Inferred minimum of ratings n̂′.
1: Infer model parameter α̂i = {α̂i,1, . . . , α̂i,m} by performing Algorithm 1 on
the historical rating set τi(t)
2: if A is majority rule then
3: α̂i,ℓi ← max{α̂i,1, . . . , α̂i,m}
4: α̂′i ← max{α̂i,1, . . . , α̂i,m} \ α̂i,ℓi
5: n̂′ ← 12α̂i,ℓi(α̂i,ℓi−α̂′i)2 ln
m
δ
6: end if
7: if A is average score rule then
8: γ̂i ←
∑
k α̂i,k, ǫ←
−
√
mγ̂i+
√
mγ̂i+4mEr
2m
9: n̂′ ← 3
ǫ2
ln 2m
δ
10: end if
11: Compute the minimum number of ratings n̂′ based
Ntest Nreliable freliable
TripAdvisor 907810 883030 97.27%
Amazon 2262036 2228173 98.50%
Ebay 16516962 16444179 99.56%
Table 13: Fraction of reliable evaluations when products meet the requirement
on inferred minimum number of ratings.
7 Related Work
Several works have investigated the problem of rating aggregation in online rat-
ing systems. For example, in [19, 4], authors proposed reputation based weighted
average score rules that compute the average rating of products weighted on the
reputation score of users. Other representative works on rating aggregation can
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be found in [13, 9, 10, 20]. However, in real online rating system based web
services, average scoring rule and majority rule are two most widely deployed
rating aggregation rules, because they are simple, easy to deploy and more im-
portantly, tested to perform well for many web services.
Several works have investigated fraud detection. For example, authors in
[11] explored review spam detection in online reviewing systems. In [5, 21]
authors studied fraud detection in trading communities. Also, fraud detection in
recommendation systems was investigated in [12, 16]. In our paper, we provide
a probabilistic model and formal analysis of users misbehavior in online ratings
systems, and show the condition in which online rating systems may not be able
to reflect the true quality of products.
Online rating systems are widely deployed in recommendation systems [18,
2]. Recommendation systems were introduced since the seminal work on collab-
orative filtering [8, 17]. In general, recommendation systems interpret ratings as
preferences of users, and try to make personalized recommendations by taking
into account the preferences of users. Researchers investigate various algorith-
mic and complexity issues in designing recommendation systems [7, 18, 2]. The
important distinction of our work is that we treat rating as product quality
assessment and we consider the condition where we can reveal the true quality
with high probability.
8 Conclusion
We present a mathematical framework to analyze online rating systems that are
widely deployed in web services such as TripAdvisor, Amazon, eBay, etc. We
first present a novel mathematical model to specify users’ rating behavior. We
then formally analyze a general model of online rating systems. Through this
analysis, we derived theoretical bounds on the desired minimum of the ratings
we need to produce a reliable evaluation on the quality of products. We extend
our model to accommodate users’ misbehavior (i.e., cheating) in product rating,
and show that the majority rule is more robust and insensitive to misbehavior
as compared with the average scoring rule. Based on our framework, we also
propose an practical algorithm to infer the minimum number of ratings, which
is effective in produce reliable product quality evaluations in real-world. We
perform experiments on both synthetic data and three large real-world data
sets (from TripAdvisor, Amazon, Ebay). Number of interesting observations
were found, e.g., generally, hundreds of ratings are sufficient to reflect the true
quality of a hotel / product on Amazon / Ebay, or the true reputation of a seller
on Ebay. Ratings on Ebay are more sufficient than TripAdvisor and Amazon.
We believe that our models and methodology can be used as important building
blocks to refine and improve online rating systems for various web services.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let ρ= (ρ1, . . . , ρm) denote the rating distribution of the user who assigns
score r+i,j . Recall that the probability distribution of ρ is Dirichlet(αi), and
Pr[r+i,j=k|ρ]=ρk, where k∈{1, . . . ,m}. Then we have:
Pr
[
r+i,j = k
]
=
∫
p(ρ)Pr
[
r+i,j = k|ρ
]
dρ
=
∫
Γ(
∑m
κ=1 αi,κ)∏m
κ=1 Γ(αi,κ)
m∏
κ=1
ραi,κ−1κ ρkdρj,1 . . . dρj,m
= αi,k, for k = 1, . . . ,m,
so this proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us state a theorem on bounding the tail probability, that will be used in
later derivation.
Theorem 9 (Chernoff Bound [15]) Let X1, . . . , Xn be n independent ran-
dom variables, with Xi=1 with probability pi and 0 otherwise. Let X=
∑n
i=1Xi
and let µ=E[X ]. Then for each ǫ ≥ 0, we have
Pr[X ≥ (1 + ǫ)µ] ≤ exp (−min(ǫ, ǫ2)µ/3) ,
Pr[X ≤ (1− ǫ)µ] ≤ exp (−ǫ2µ/3) .
25
Now we can prove Theorem 1 by applying Theorem 9 as follows. Let ni,k=
|{ri,j |ri,j ∈ ri, ri,j = k}| denote the number of ratings that equal to k. By basic
probability arguments, we can derive the probability of failing to extract the
true label as follows:
Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi
]
= Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi, ni,ℓi <
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
+
Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi, ni,ℓi ≥
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤ Pr
[
ni,ℓi <
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
+
Pr
[
∃k 6= ℓi that ni,k > ni,ℓi , ni,ℓi ≥
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤Pr
[
ni,ℓi<
αi,ℓi+α˜i
2
ni
]
+
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k>
αi,ℓi+α˜i
2
ni
]
. (5)
Let us now proceed to individually derive these two terms of the above inequal-
ity.
One can apply the Chernoff Bound to bound the first term of Inequality (5).
Observe that E[ni,k] = niαi,k. Based on this observation, we can write down
the first term of Inequality (5) as follows:
Pr
[
ni,ℓi<
αi,ℓi+α˜i
2
ni
]
=Pr
[
ni,ℓi<E[ni,ℓi ]
(
1−αi,ℓi−α˜i
2αi,ℓi
)]
,
by applying Chernoff Bound we have
Pr
[
ni,ℓi≤
αi,ℓi+α˜i
2
ni
]
≤exp
(
− (αi,ℓi−α˜i)
2
3(2αi,ℓi)
2
E[ni,ℓi ]
)
= exp
(
− (αi,ℓi−α˜i)
2
12αi,ℓi
ni
)
,
by substituting ni with Inequality (3), we have
Pr
[
ni,ℓi≤
αi,ℓi+α˜i
2
ni
]
≤ δ
m
. (6)
The remaining issue is to derive the last term of Inequality (5). Since E[ni,k] =
niαi,k. Based on this observation, we can write down the last term of Inequality
26
(5) as follows:
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k >
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
=
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k > E[ni,k]
(
1 +
αi,ℓi + α˜i − 2αi,k
2αi,k
)]
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
−E[ni,k]
3
×
min
{
αi,ℓi + α˜i − 2αi,k
2αi,k
,
(αi,ℓi + α˜i − 2αi,k)2
(2αi,k)2
})
, (7)
where the last step is obtained by applying Chernoff Bound. Since αi,ℓi + α˜i −
2αi,k ≥ αi,ℓi − α˜i ≥ 0, thus we have
min
{
αi,ℓi + α˜i − 2αi,k
2αi,k
,
(αi,ℓi + α˜i − 2αi,k)2
(2αi,k)2
}
≥ min
{
αi,ℓi − α˜i
2αi,k
,
(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
(2αi,k)2
}
≥ αi,ℓi − α˜i
2αi,k
min
{
1,
αi,ℓi − α˜i
2α˜i
}
, ∀k 6= ℓi,
applying this inequality to Inequality (7), we obtain
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k >
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
− (αi,ℓi − α˜i)ni
6
min
{
1,
αi,ℓi − α˜i
2α˜i
})
. (8)
We can further simplify this inequality under the following two cases.
Case 1: α˜i<αi,ℓi/3. In this case, (αi,ℓi−α˜i)/(2α˜i)>1. Therefore min {1, (αi,ℓi − α˜i)/(2α˜i)}=
1. Applying this to Inequality (8) and substituting ni with Inequality (3), we
have
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k>
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
− 2αi,ℓi
αi,ℓi − α˜i
ln
m
δ
)
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
−2 ln m
δ
)
=
m− 1
m2
δ2. (9)
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Case 2: α˜i ≥ αi,ℓi/3. In this case, (αi,ℓi−α˜i)/(2α˜i) ≤ 1. We have min {1, (αi,ℓi − α˜i)/(2α˜i)} =
(αi,ℓi − α˜i)/(2α˜i). Applying this equation to Inequality (8) and substituting ni
with Inequality (3), we have
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k >
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
−αi,ℓi
α˜i
ln
m
δ
)
≤
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
exp
(
− ln m
δ
)
=
m− 1
m
δ. (10)
Combining Inequality (9) and Inequality (10), we have
m∑
k=1
k 6=ℓi
Pr
[
ni,k >
αi,ℓi + α˜i
2
ni
]
≤ m− 1
m
δ. (11)
Applying Inequality (6) and Inequality (11) to Inequality (5), we complete the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let us state a theorem on bounding the tail probability, that will be used in
later derivation.
Theorem 10 ([14, 6]) Let X be a sum of independent random variables, each
attaining values in [0, 1], and let σ =
√
Var[X ] ≥ 200. Then for all t ∈ [0, σ2100 ],
we have
Pr[X ≥ E[X ] + t] ≥ c exp
(
− t
2
3σ2
)
,
for a suitable constant c > 0.
Now we can prove Theorem 2 by applying Theorem 10 as follows. Recall
that ni,k is the number of ratings that equal k. Let ℓ˜i = argmink{|αi,k − α˜i|}.
We can derive a general lower bound of the probability that we fail to extract
the true label as follows:
Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi
]
≥ Pr
[
n
i,ℓ˜i
> ni,ℓi
]
.
Let Ri,j , j∈{1, . . . , ni} denote a set of random variables with
Ri,j =

1, with probability Pr[r+i,j = ℓ˜i]
0, with probability Pr[r+i,j = ℓi]
1/2, otherwise
,
where the probability mass function of r+i,j is derived in Lemma 1. Observe that
Ri>ni/2 if and only if the number of ratings equal ℓi is smaller than the number
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of ratings equal ℓ˜i, or ni,ℓ˜i >ni,ℓi . Thus we have Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6=ℓi
]
≥Pr [Ri> ni2 ]. In
the following, we seek to complete the proof by showing Pr[Ri>ni/2] ≥ Ω(δ).
Here we apply Theorem 10 to give a lower bound of Pr[Ri > ni/2]. First we
can express the expectation and variance of Ri as:
E[Ri] = ni/2− (αi,ℓi − α˜i)ni/2,
Var[Ri] =
(
αi,ℓi + α˜i − (αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
)
ni/4.
Let t = ni(αi,ℓi − α˜i)/2 + ǫ, where 0 < ǫ < 10−10. Observe that E[Ri] + t =
ni/2 + ǫ > ni/2, thus Pr
[
Ri >
ni
2
] ≥ Pr [Ri ≥ E[Ri] + t]. Before applying
Theorem 10 to derive a lower bound of Pr [Ri≥E[Ri] + t], we need to check
whether some conditions specified in Theorem 10 are satisfied.
Let us first check whether
√
Var[Ri] ≥ 200 holds. Since
100
101
αi,ℓi≤ α˜i ⇔ αi,ℓi − α˜i ≤
1
201
(αi,ℓi + α˜i). (12)
Based this observation, we can derive a lower bound of αi,ℓi + α˜i − (αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
as follow:
αi,ℓi + α˜i − (αi,ℓi − α˜i)2 ≥ αi,ℓi + α˜i −
(
αi,ℓi + α˜i
201
)2
≥ 200× 202
2012
(
αi,ℓi +
100
101
αi,ℓi
)
≥ 1.99αi,ℓi. (13)
By applying Inequality (13), the lower bound of Var[Ri] is
Var[Ri] ≥ 1.99
4
niαi,ℓi = O
(
1.99
4
α2i,ℓi
(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
ln
1
δ
)
≥ O
(
1.99× 1012
4
ln
1
δ
)
.
By making the left side of this inequality larger or equal to 40000, we guarantee
that
√
Var[Ri]≥ 200, or δ≤O(e−7.9). Hence, by letting η=O(e−7.9), then for
any δ≤η, we have
√
Var[Ri]≥200.
Let us continue to check whether t ∈ [0,Var[Ri]/100]. By apply Inequality
(12), we could derive an upper bound of t/Var[Ri] as follows:
t
Var[Ri]
=
2(αi,ℓi − α˜i)
αi,ℓi + α˜i − (αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
+
ǫ
Var[Ri]
≤ 2
(
αi,ℓi + α˜i
αi,ℓi − α˜i
− (αi,ℓi − α˜i)
)−1
+ 10−14
≤ 2
(
201− 1
201
(αi,ℓi + α˜i)
)−1
+ 10−14 ≤ 1
100
.
Thus we have that t ∈ [0,Var[Ri]/100].
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Finally, we can apply Theorem 10 to derive a lower bound of Pr [Ri>ni/2]
as follows:
Pr
[
Ri>
ni
2
]
≥ Pr[Ri ≥ E[Ri] + t] ≥ c exp
(
− t
2
3Var[Ri]
)
= c exp
(
−1
3
ni(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
αi,ℓi + α˜i − (αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
)
≥ c exp
(
−1
3
ni(αi,ℓi − α˜i)2
1.99αi,ℓi
)
≥ Ω(δ)
Thus, Pr
[
ℓ̂i 6= ℓi
]
≥ Pr [Ri > ni2 ] ≥ Ω(δ).
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove this theorem by extending Theorem 1. First let us present a
probabilistic interpretation of the random misbehaving users as follows: with
probability fi we generate a misbehaving user to rate product Pi, and with
probability 1− fi we generate an honest user to rate product Pi. This interpre-
tation describes a new generative process for ratings with random misbehaving
users. Let ri be a rating generated by that new generative process. Observe
that Pr[ri = k|random misbehavior] = 1m and Pr[ri = k|sincere] = αi,k, where
k = 1, . . . ,m. Then we can compute the probability mass function of ri as
follows:
Pr[ri = k] =
fi
m
+ (1− fi)αi,k, for k = 1, . . . ,m.
It follows that Pr[ri = ℓi] = argmax{Pr[ri = k]} and fi/m + (1 − fi)α˜i are the
largest and second largest among Pr[ri =1], . . . ,Pr[ri=m] respectively. Then,
by a similar derivation with Theorem 1, we finish this proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
We prove this theorem by extending Theorem 1. First let us present a
probabilistic interpretation of the bias misbehaving users as follows: with prob-
ability f ′i we generate a biased misbehaving user to rate product Pi, and with
probability 1 − f ′i we generate a honest user to rate product Pi. This inter-
pretation describes a new generative process for ratings with biased misbehav-
ing users. Let r′i be a rating generated by that new generative process. Ob-
serve that Pr[r′i = k|biased misbehavior] = 1 with k = ℓ′i and 0 otherwise, and
Pr[r′i=k|sincere]=αi,k, ∀k. Then we have:
Pr [r′i = k] =
{
f ′i + (1− f ′i)αi,ℓ′i , for k = ℓ′i
(1− f ′i)αi,k, otherwise
.
We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: ℓ′i 6= ℓi. Observe that
f ′i >
αi,ℓi − αi,ℓ′i
1 + αi,ℓi − αi,ℓ′i
⇔ f ′i + (1 − f ′i)αi,ℓ′i > (1− f ′i)αi,ℓi .
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Thus Pr[r′i= ℓ
′
i]=f
′
i + (1 − f ′i)αi,ℓ′i and Pr[r′i= ℓi]=(1− f ′i)αi,ℓi are the largest
and second largest among Pr[r′i=1], . . . ,Pr[r
′
i=m] respectively. Therefore, with
a large enough value of ni, the number of ratings that equal to ℓ
′
i will be the
largest with high probability. Then by a similar derivation with Theorem 1, we
could finish the proof for this case.
Case 2: ℓ′i = ℓi. Observe that Pr[r
′
i = ℓi] = f
′
i + (1 − f ′i)αi,ℓi and (1 − f ′i)α˜i
are the largest and second largest among Pr[r′=1], . . . ,Pr[r′=m] respectively.
Thus we extract the label ℓi with a high probability with large enough value of
ni. Finally, by a similar derivation with Theorem 1, one completes the proof.
8.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Let βi,k =
∑m
j=k αi,j . Observe that γi =
∑m
k=1 kαi,k =
∑m
k=1 βi,k. Recall that
we use ni,k, k = 1, . . . ,m, to denote the number of ratings that equal to k. Let
n′i,k =
∑m
j=k ni,j , k = 1, . . . ,m, denote the number of ratings which are no less
than k. Then we have
M∑
j=1
ri,j =
m∑
k=1
kni,k =
m∑
k=1
n′i,k.
Then it follows that our problem can be formulated to bound
|r̂i − γi| =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
n′i,k
ni
−
m∑
k=1
βi,k
∣∣∣∣∣ .
In the following, we will first seek to bound |n′i,k/ni − βi,k|, and then we apply
this bound to complete our proof.
We bound |n′i,k/ni − βi,k| by the following claim:
• Claim 1: For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Inequality (4) holds, then∣∣∣∣n′i,kni − βi,k
∣∣∣∣≤
{
ǫ2, βi,k ≤ ǫ2
ǫ
√
βi,k, otherwise
(14)
holds with probability at least 1− δ/m.
Let us prove this claim here. Let Ij,k, j = 1, . . . , ni, k = 1, . . . ,m be a set of
indicator random variables such that
Ij,k=
{
1, if r+i,j ≥ k
0, otherwise
.
From Lemma 1 we have that Pr[r+i,j = k] = αi,k, where k = 1, . . . ,m and j =
1, . . . , ni. Thus Pr[r
+
i,j ≥ k]=βi,k. Therefore, we could have Pr[Ij,k = 1]=βi,k.
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It follows that E
[∑ni
j=1 Ij,k
]
= niβi,k. Observe that n
′
i,k =
∑ni
j=1 Ij,k. Let us
consider a special case, βi,k=0 first. For this special case, by a simple check, we
could see that claim 1 holds. Then we consider the case, βi,k ≥ ǫ2. Observe that
for this case the inequality 0 < ǫ/
√
βi,k < 1 holds. Based on this observation,
we can further show:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣n′i,kni − βi,k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ√βi,k]
≥ 1− Pr
[∣∣∣∣n′i,kni − βi,k
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ√βi,k]
= 1− Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ni∑
j=1
Ij,k − niβi,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ√βi,k niβi,k

≥ 1− 2 exp
(
−ni ǫ
2
3
)
≥ 1− δ
m
,
where the last two steps are obtained by applying Chernoff Bound and by sub-
stituting ni with Inequality (4) respectively. Finally, we consider the case,
0 < βi,k < ǫ
2. Observe that for this case the inequality ǫ/
√
βi,k > 1 holds.
Then by a derivation as the previous case, we obtain
Pr
[∣∣∣∣n′i,kni − βi,k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2] ≥ 1− δm
holds. Hence we proved Claim 1.
Let Ek denote the event that Inequality (14) holds for a specific value k.
Then based on claim 1, we have Pr[Ek] ≥ δ/m. Then we can derive the proba-
bility that events E1, . . . , Em all holds as follows:
Pr
[
m⋂
k=1
Ek
]
= 1− Pr
[
m⋃
k=1
Ek
]
≥ 1−
m∑
k=1
Pr
[
Ek
]
≥ 1−
m∑
k=1
δ
m
≥ 1− δ.
Suppose that events E1, . . . , Em all holds then,
|r̂i − γi| =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
n′i,k
ni
−
m∑
k=1
βi,k
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
m∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣n′i,kni − βi,k
∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫ
m∑
k=1
max
{√
βi,k, ǫ
}
≤ ǫ
m∑
k=1
√
βi,k +mǫ
2
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by applying Cauthy’s Inequality we have:
|r̂i − γi| ≤ ǫ
√√√√m m∑
k=1
βi,k +mǫ
2
= ǫ
√
mγi +mǫ
2
The proof can be completed by recalling that the probability that eventsE1, . . . , Em
all holds is at least 1− δ.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 7
When there is fi fraction of random misbehaving users, the average rating r̂i
of product Pi converges to (1 − fi)γi + fim/2= γi + (m/2 − γi)fi. Since ni ≥
3 ln(2m/δ)/ǫ2 holds, then with a similar derivation of Theorem 6, we could
obtain that: ∣∣∣∑
j
ri,j/ni − (γi + (m/2− γi)fi)
∣∣∣
≤ ǫ
√
m (γi + (m/2− γi)fi) +mǫ2 (15)
holds with probability at least 1− δ. Observe that∣∣∣m
2
−γi
∣∣∣ fi−∣∣∣∣
∑
j ri,j
ni
−
(
γi+
m
2
fi − γifi
)∣∣∣∣≤ ∣∣∣∣
∑
j ri,j
ni
−γi
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣m
2
− γi
∣∣∣ fi + ∣∣∣∣
∑
j ri,j
ni
−
(
γi +
m
2
fi − γifi
)∣∣∣∣ ,
by applying Inequality (15) to this inequality we can finish the proof of this
theorem.
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